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ARTICLES
DEATH PENALTY: NATIONAL DISASTER VISITS
CALIFORNIA
Walter L. Gordon, III*
I. INTRODUCTION: HUMAN RIGHTS
The United States is entering the final fateful decade of the
20th century. Fin-de-sicle themes of decay and decline are common
in the literature. Violence is endemic in the nation; major American
cities are the most homicidal in the industrial world. Unlike other
economically developed democratic nations, the United States justi-
fies and is deeply involved in killing. Over 2500 persons await exe-
cution on the nation's death rows.' The United States is almost alone
in executing persons for ordinary crimes.' But even among the
mainly third-world nations that retain the death penalty, the United
States is among the most regressive and repressive.' The United
States permits the executions of minors4 and the mentally retarded,"
* B.S., 1963, Ohio State University; M.P.A., 1965, J.D., 1973, Ph.D., 1981, University
of California at Los Angeles.
1. As of April 16, 1992, there were 2588 persons on death rows across the United
States. Philip Hager, Plans for Harris Execution Renew National Debate, L.A. TIMES, Apr.
16, 1992, at A3. Over 98% of death row inmates were male, 40% were African-American and
90% had not gone to college. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS 705, tbl. 6.142 (1991) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK 19911. For transnational crime
rates, see CAROL B. KALISH, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INTERNATIONAL CRIME RATES (May
1988); see also infra app. tbl. I.
2. The term "ordinary crimes" refers to penal code offenses prosecuted in state courts,
such as robbery, rape, and murder. England, for example, does not execute for ordinary crimes
but retains the penalty for wartime offenses such as treason. AMNESTY INT'L, UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA THE DEATH PENALTY 228 (1987).
3. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 2, at 73-87, 189-91. In 1990, the United States was the
tenth leading state killer w6rldwide; the other nine were all third-world nations. Speaking of
the Ultimate Punishment, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1992, at H5; see infra app. Table II.
4. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (permitting the execution of 16 and
17 year olds); see also Lisa K. Arnett, Comment, Death at an Early Age: International Law
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although evolving international standards forbid execution of a mem-
ber of one of these groups.'
Amnesty International has condemned the United States as a
violator of human rights for the design and operation of its death
penalty system.7 It found that the system designed in the United
States was racially biased, unfair, and arbitrary.' In its 1987 report
on the issue, Amnesty International noted: "No means of limiting
the death penalty can prevent its being imposed arbitrarily or un-
fairly. This is borne out by the experience in the USA, where the
introduction of elaborate judicial safeguards has failed to ensure that
the death penalty is fairly and consistently applied."'
Amnesty's critique raises profound issues of social peace in a
society deeply divided along race and class lines. It is certainly a
legitimate question of political discourse to debate the wisdom and
justice of the death penalty. The industrialized nations of Europe,
including France and Germany, have eliminated the death penalty.'
The United Kingdom does not retain it for ordinary crimes." Amer-
ican society must join the international consensus against executions
and introduce the principle and practice of nonviolence into the na-
tional political culture. For the foreseeable future, however, the
United States is firmly committed to state killing, a lone ranger
among industrialized-democratic nations.
II. UNITED STATES NATIONAL CHARACTER: VIOLENCE
The United States has a unique national character that is
shaped by its own peculiar violent and racist history. Americans are
fascinated by violent death. Nowhere is this national character more
evident than in the varied killing techniques employed in the nation's
execution chambers.12 Of those nations that still execute persons,
Arguments Against the Death Penalty for Juveniles, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 245, 251-57, 265
(1988).
5. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (permitting the execution of severely men-
tally retarded persons). In Lynaugh the defendant had the mental capacity of a six-and-a-half
year old. Id. at 308; see John Blume & David Bruck, Sentencing the Mentally Retarded to
Death: An Eighth Amendment Analysis, 41 ARK. L. REV. 725 (1988) (arguing that mental
retardation should be a mitigating factor in the sentencing process).
6. See AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 2, at 73-87, 189-91.
7. Id. at 189-91.
8. Id. at 54-64, 189.
9. Id. at 189.
10. Id. at 228.
11. Id.; Susan D. Rice, Death Row Assault is Worldwide, L.A. DAILY J., Dec. 17,
1992, § I, at 9.
12. See LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1990 CAPITAL PUNISH-
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most either hang or shoot them."3 The United States is exceptional
for its many sanctioned methods of state killing. Of the thirty-six
states and the federal government that have death penalty statutes,
most kill either by lethal injection or electrocution, while several pro-
vide for gassing, shooting, or hanging, or a combination of these.14
Lethal injection is the most recent technological innovation,
with Charles Brooks, Jr., being the first to die by this method in
Texas in 1982.' The older methods of execution had disadvantages
that made them troubling to some. One author noted: "The bloody
destruction of the firing squad, the horrible disfigurement of a hang-
ing, the burning flesh of an electrocution, and the agony of suffoca-
tion from the poisons of a gas chamber all act to temper strong
desires for the execution of capital offenders.""
Lethal injection is less likely to induce severe pain and to muti-
late the body than the other killing techniques."' The prisoner is put
to sleep with massive doses of barbiturates and then the death drugs
are administered. There are risks that the victim might wake up
during the execution, that the drugs might be administered incor-
rectly, or that the method used might inflict pain. 9 But most legisla-
tors and the public feel that lethal injection is the most humane way
of killing condemned persons.20 A poll taken after California's first
gassing in twenty-five years indicated that 63% of the public pre-
ferred lethal injection, while only 12% favored gas.21 This finding is
supported by other polls.
MENT 5 (1991).
13. See, e.g., Thomas 0. Finks, Lethal Injection: An Uneasy Alliance of Law and
Medicine, 4 J. LEGAL MED. 383, 386 (1983); Speaking of the Ultimate Punishment, supra
note 3, at H5.
14. GREENFELD, supra note 12, at 4-5.
15. Finks, supra note 13, at 385. Effective January 1, 1993, California death row in-
mates will have a choice between gas or lethal injection. 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. 558 (West); see
also Paul Jacobs, Execution by Lethal Injection OK'd, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1992, at A17.
16. Finks, supra note 13, at 383.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 388-89; Carl Ingram, Legislators Press for Change to Lethal Injection, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 22, 1992, at All.
19. Finks, supra note 13, at 396-97; Jacobs, supra note 15, at A17. In 1988, an in-
mate's "muscular arms and previous drug use caused [the] tube carrying [the death drugs to]
leak, prolonging his execution." Execution Prolonged When Tube in Killer's Muscular Arm
Leaks, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1988, at 27; see also AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 2, at 116.
20. Jacobs, supra note 15, at A17; George Skehon, The Times Poll: Death Penalty
Support Still Strong in State, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1992, at Al; Sam Stanton, Debate Rages
Over Execution Policies, L.A. DAILY J., June 3, 1992, § 11, at 1.
21. Skelton, supra note 20, at Al; see also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEROOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 705 (1985) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK 1985).
1993]
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Nonetheless, lethal injection raises unique ethical issues regard-
ing the relationship between the medical profession and the execu-
tion chamber. Lethal injection is a medical technique to administer
death and conflicts with the Hippocratic Oath taken by doctors.2
Moreover, it is a procedure that requires the executioners to lay
hands on the victim when searching for a vein to inject the drugs. 8
This search can take time if the person is diabetic or an intravenous
drug user whose veins have collapsed.2 4 This is the reason California
prison guards oppose lethal injection and prefer the killing distance
of the gas chamber.2 5
As the 20th century ends, the United States is nationalizing its
executions. From 1977, when executions were resumed with the
shooting of Gary Gilmore in Utah," until April 1, 1992, 168 per-
sons have been executed.2" The numbers rise steadily. All but
twenty-one of the 168 executions have occurred in the South, led by
Texas, Louisiana, and Florida. 8 However, in 1990 this pattern be-
gan to change. Illinois and Oklahoma had their first executions in
decades.29 In April 1992, Arizona and California had their first ex-
ecutions in a quarter of a century."0 These executions are part of a
trend of nationalization of executions, a spread into the industrial or
Western states such as Illinois and Arizona. Other states with large
death row populations such as Pennsylvania and Ohio wait in the
wings.31 A comparison of the statistics shown in Tables IV and V"2
indicates the regional pattern of executions and the potential for in-
crease as executions spread outside the South. The nation is at a
crossroads and it is appropriate to reconsider the path the nation has
traveled in the past two decades. The United States has chosen a
different path than other Western industrial nations which rejected
22. Finks, supra note 13, at 389-95.
23. Jacobs, supra note 15, at A17.
24. Finks, supra note 13, at 397; Execution Prolonged When Tube in Killer's Muscu-
lar Arm Leaks, supra note 19, at 27; AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 2, at 116.
25. Jacobs, supra note 15, at A17.
26. See generally NORMAN MAILER, THE EXECUTIONER'S SONG (1979) (describing the
events leading to Utah's execution of Gary Gilmore).
27. Hager, supra note 1, at A3.
28. Id.
29. Lee Mitgang, Executions Move Out of South, L.A. DAILY J., Sept. 19, 1990, § II,
aL I.
30. Arizona gassed Donald Eugene Harding on April 6, 1992, its first execution in 29
years. Stanton, supra note 20, § II, at 14. On the California execution of Robert Alton Har-
ris, see Dan Morain & Tom Gorman, Harris Dies After Judicial Duel, 4 Stays Quashed,
"I'm Sorry," Murderer Says, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1992, at Al.
31. Hager, supra note 1, at A3.
32. See infra app. this. IV & V.
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the death penalty as a tool of social policy. 8 The United States is
destined to test, once again, the proposition that the way to end kill-
ing is to kill. In addition, the United States has further exacerbated
the moral dilemma by designing a death system which is condemned
by human rights watchdogs as violating human rights.
3 4
III. GUIDED DISCRETION: THE POSTMODERN DEATH SYSTEM
A. Debate on Death
Between 1967 and 1977, a moratorium on executions existed in
the United States, as debate raged on whether to follow the world
trend and abolish capital punishment."' Over six hundred persons
were spared their lives during this period." In 1977 the debate was
resolved in favor of executions, when Gary Gilmore was shot to
death in Utah. 7 The body politic reached a consensus as reflected in
United States Supreme Court decisionss and buttressed by a robust
public opinion that the United States should reinstitute the death
penalty. 9 The Supreme Court sought to make the death penalty
palatable by creating a mythology that the procedures it designed
would eliminate the arbitrariness and capriciousness which defined
the process in the past.' This article will briefly examine these pro-
cedures, since they are the framework within which the state sys-
33. "The great majority of countries in Western Europe and North and South America
have abandoned capital punishment." Rice, supra note 11, at 9. The reason for the rejection is
that "[t]here is a growing international consensus that the death penalty is incompatible ...
[with] [t]he right to life and the right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment .... " AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 2, at 178.
34. See generally AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 2, at 3-7, 189-91.
35. Michael D. Rhoads, Comment, Resurrection of Capital Punishment-The 1976
Death Penalty Cases, 81 DICK. L. REV. 543, 543-44 (1977). On the moratorium, see Ray-
mond J. Pascucci, Special Project, Capital Punishment in 1984: Abandoning the Pursuit of
Fairness and Consistency, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1129, 1130 n.3 (1984); Donald R. Wright,
The Role of the Judiciary from Marbury to Anderson, 60 CAL. L. REV. 1262, 1273-75
(1972); MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 106-25 (1973).
36. Rhoads, supra note 35, at 544.
37. Id. at 544 n.8. See generally MAILER, supra note 26.
38. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976);
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976);
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
39. In 1976, 66% of the national public supported the death penalty. SOURCEBOOK
1991, supra note 1, at 212-13, tbl. 2.46. This percentage increased to 72% in 1991. Id. A high
point of 76% was reached in 1985. Id. In 1972, the year Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972), was decided, 53% favored and 39% opposed capital punishment. SOURCEBOOK 1985,
supra note 21, at 175-77. Opposition to the death penalty peaked in 1966 and has since
declined. Id. at 175-76.
40. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188-95; AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 2, at 182-91.
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tems, including California's system, fit.4 '
B. Design of the Death System
The moratorium on executions in the United States from 1967
to 1977 was made official in 1972 when the United States Supreme
Court decided Furman v. Georgia.42 That decision declared all ex-
isting death penalty systems unconstitutional. Furman v. Georgia
was a plurality decision with no single opinion by the Court.48
Hindsight indicates, however, that the key opinion was that by Jus-
tice Stewart who stated that the chief problem with the prevailing
death penalty statutes was that they allowed uncontrolled discretion
by the fact finder in determining who would receive the penalty.""
Only a year before, in McGautha v. California," the Court had
decided this issue the other way, holding that it was not a violation
of the Constitution if fact finders did not have standards to guide
their decision to impose the death sentence. Justice Harlan noted in
the lead opinion: "To identify before the fact those characteristics of
criminal homicides and their perpetrators which call for the death
penalty, and to express these characteristics in language which can
be fairly understood and applied by the sentencing authority, appear
to be tasks which are beyond human ability. ' '46 A year later the
Court reversed itself and struck down the existing state statutes be-
cause they did not guide the discretion of the juries. 47 This unguided
discretion resulted in the imposition of the death penalty in a freak-
ish and wanton manner. It was not until 1976 that the United States
Supreme Court indicated the procedural outlines of a death system it
would accept, one, it maintained, that eliminated the vices of the ear-
lier system.48
A primary defect of the pre-Furman49 death system was the
41. For the California system, see infra part VI.
42. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 306-10.
45. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), overruled by Crampton v. Ohio, 408
U.S. 941 (1972).
46. Id. at 204.
47. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
48. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976);
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976);
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
49. On the pre-Furman death penalty, see James M. Papada III, Comment, Furman
v. Georgia: A Postmortem on the Death Penalty, 18 VILL. L. REV. 678 (1973). See generally
MELTSNER, supra note 35.
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belief that victims were selected by race.50 The United States has
kept statistics on executions since 1930."5 Between 1930 and 1980,
3862 persons were executed and, of these, 2066 (53.5%) were
black.52 On their face, these statistics raise an inference that race was
an important factor in the selection process. However, at the time
Furman was decided, research was not conclusive on the issue. 3
The basic challenge the Court faced was to design a system that
would eliminate all arbitrary factors, such as race or income, when
selecting those persons to be executed from the universe of those who
committed murder. A study done in California illustrates the prob-
lem.5 ' Statistics from this study indicated that for every one hundred
"special circumstances" murder cases (i.e., those in which the death
penalty was at issue), 51% resulted in trial.5 Of those, only two-
fifths went to a penalty phase in which the issue of death was tried."
Of those that proceeded to the penalty phase, roughly 10% ended
with a death sentence. 7 How did this 10% differ from the 90% who
committed first degree murder and did not receive a death
sentence ?
The Supreme Court's resolution was to design a set of proce-
dures to eliminate unconstitutional bias and prejudice from the death
selection process, and to ensure that the persons selected for execu-
tion were different substantively from the bulk of murderers who did
not get death.' 9 On July 2, 1976 the Supreme Court decided five
cases that set the new ground rules for the death penalty in this
country.60 The Court overruled mandatory systems that inflicted the
50. Furman, 408 U.S. at 249-57 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 364-65 (Marshall, J.,
concurring). But see id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring). See generally BOB WOODWARD &
ScoTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 241-67 (1981).
51. William J. Bowers & Glenn L. Pierce, Arbitrariness and Discrimination under
Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 26 CRIM. & DELINQ. 563, 575 (1980).
52. Id. at 575.
53. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 310 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 389-90 n.12
(1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
54. William J. Kopeny, Capital Punishment-Who Should Choose?, 12 W. ST. U. L.




58. A pre-Furman study of California death sentences between 1958 and 1966 found
that juries discriminated against blue collar defendants in an unconstitutional manner. Special
Issue, Note, A Study of the California Penalty Jury in First-Degree Murder Cases, 21 STAN.
L. REV. 1297, 1421 (1969).
59. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187-96 (1976).
60. Id.; Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976);
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
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death penalty without consideration of the individual characteristics
of either the crime or the defendant.6 ' The Court held that the fatal
flaw of the pre-Furman system was the unbridled discretion of the
fact finder which often resulted in arbitrary and capricious deci-
sions.6 2 The Court substituted a system of "guided discretion," char-
acterized by: (1) A bifurcated trial, with separate fact finding and
sentencing hearings; (2) specified statutes that set forth predeter-
mined aggravating and mitigating circumstances determining those
who are eligible for death; (3) proportionality in sentences for
murders in similar circumstances; and (4) a system of appellate re-
view of death sentences.6" This procedural system was based on pro-
posals made by the American Law Institute in its Model Penal
Code.6' The hallmark of this procedural system was discretion,
guided by clear and objective standards, so that death was imposed
fairly and consistently on the most deserving defendants.65
Justice Potter Stewart wrote the key opinion in the 1976 death
penalty cases and was a leading architect of the guided discretion
framework.66 The death penalty decisions in his tenure generally
limited the scope of the penalty to murder,67 allowed consideration of
any mitigating circumstances,66 required fairly precise language in
aggravating circumstances,69 and required an intent to kill by accom-
61. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 308; Roberts, 428 U.S. at 336. See generally John W. Poulos,
The Supreme Court, Capital Punishment and the Substantive Criminal Law: The Rise and
Fall of Mandatory Capital Punishment, 28 ARIZ. L. REV. 143 (1986) (discussing mandatory
state death penalty legislation between Furman and Woodson).
62. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187-96.
63. Id. at 204-07.
64. Id. at 189-96.
65. Id. at 206-07; see Bruce J. Meagher, Note, Capital Punishment: A Review of the
Recent Supreme Court Decisions, 52 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 261 (1976); David Rosenberg &
Ken Levy, Capital Punishment: Coming to Grips with the Dignity of Man, 14 CAL. W. L.
REV. 275 (1978).
66. Larry I. Palmer, Two Perspectives on Structuring Discretion: Justices Stewart and
White on the Death Penalty, 70 J. CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 194 (1979).
67. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (finding no death penalty for rape).
68. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (stating fact finder must consider all fac-
tors in mitigation even if not enumerated in statute).
69. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (stating all evidence, including de-
fendant's turbulent family history, must be considered in mitigation); Bullington v. Missouri,
451 U.S. 430 (1981) (applying double jeopardy doctrine to sentencing stage of a capital case so
that upon retrial a defendant may not be sentenced to death if a life sentence was received at
first trial); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) (forbidding use of expert witness testimony
on death sentence against defendant if based on an interview with defendant in which there
was no advice regarding the right against self-incrimination); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S.
420 (1980) (finding aggravating factors which are too vague will render death sentence uncon-
stitutional); Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980) (forbidding exclusion of juror from a capital
case unless reservations about the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair the
[Vol. 33
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plices in felony-murder killings."
Stewart's replacement by Sandra Day O'Connor resulted in a
shift in the direction of the Court.7 1 The death penalty decisions
since 1983 have abandoned the finely crafted limits on the penalty
and lurched toward a system with an ever-expanding ambit for the
imposition of death. Before 1987, the two most significant decisions
of the post-Stewart Court were Pulley v. Harris,"2 which eliminated
the requirement that death sentences be proportionate in similar cir-
cumstances, and Wainwright v. Witt,73 which cut the heart out of
Witherspoon v. Illinois 7' and made it easier for prosecutors to select
a so-called "death qualified jury;" i.e. one with no persons on it who
might have some scruples against the death penalty.75 Essentially,
the vaunted "guided discretion" death penalty system has now
evolved to the point that once a death-qualified jury finds a single
aggravating factor, it has unlimited discretion to impose the death
penalty.7
6
performance of juror's duties); Presnell v. Georgia, 439 U.S. 14 (1978) (stating jury must find
an aggravating factor before imposing the death penalty).
70. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (stating an accomplice in felony murder
case must personally kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill victim before a lawful capital sen-
tence can be imposed).
71. Pascucci, supra note 35, at 1162-1216. Justice Potter Stewart retired in 1981 and
was replaced that same year by Sandra Day O'Connor. ELDER WITT, CONGRESSIONAL
QUARTERLY GUIDE TO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 872, 879 (2d ed. 1990).
72. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984).
73. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
74. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
75. See id. at 439-63 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S.
162 (1986); AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 2, at 34-39.
76. The cases that eroded the guided discretion system and taken together have injected
arbitrariness are Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987) (eroding further the intent require-
ment in felony murder situation if participation is major and mental state is one of reckless
indifference to the value of human life); Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376 (1986) (weakening
the holding in Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), by holding that the relevant finding of
intent to kill can be made at the appellate level if not made by the trial court); Lockhart v.
McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986) (allowing exclusion of jurors with scruples against the death
penalty for cause at guilt phase of capital trial); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985)
(providing massive retreat from standard set in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968),
for elimination of jurors with scruples against capital punishment and insulating the finding by
a state court from review at the federal level); Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985) (finding
no double jeopardy claim if one state sentences a person to death for the same act of murder
that another state had previously sentenced the person to life imprisonment); Pulley v. Harris,
465 U.S. 37 (1984) (requiring no statewide proportionality review of death sentences); Strick-
land v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (setting standard for ineffective assistance of counsel
in death cases); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984) (holding it is constitutionally permis-
sible for a judge to override a jury's life sentence and impose death if state law so provides);
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983) (finding a death sentence is valid even if one of the
aggravating factors upon which it was based is later found invalid); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463
292 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33
IV. RACE AND GUIDED DISCRETION
The United States Supreme Court maintains the fiction that the
death penalty system it has imposed on the nation works in a neu-
tral, non-arbitrary fashion. The post-Furman death penalty system
has operated for over a decade. There is now enough empirical evi-
dence to determine whether or not the system operates as designed.
The evidence demonstrates that the system continues to operate per-
versely by selecting those who are sent to death row, not on the basis
of standards mandated by statute, but on the race of the victim, 77 as
U.S. 880 (1983) (finding death sentence based on psychiatrist's prediction of future violent
conduct is lawful and procedures designed to restrict federal habeas corpus relief are unobjec-
tionable); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983) (finding Federal Constitution does not
prohibit a mandatory jury instruction that a life without parole sentence could be commuted by
the governor in the future); Wainwright v. Goode, 464 U.S. 78 (1983) (finding no constitu-
tional defect if reliance is placed on an aggravating factor not found in statute); See generally
Pascucci, supra note 35, at 1162-1216. Most importantly, see McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S.
279 (1987); see infra text accompanying notes 84-105.
In fairness to the Court, not all of the death penalty cases decided since 1983 have under-
mined the restrictions made between 1977 and 1983. Except for McCleskey v. Kemp, the deci-
sions on race have been progressive. See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986) (examining
jurors about racial attitudes is acceptable in an interracial murder trial); Baston v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79 (1986) (discharging jurors peremptorily from a jury for racial reasons is unaccept-
able). Other decisions have generally reinforced rules already set down by the Stewart Court.
See Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987) (stating factfinder must consider all factors in
mitigation of death sentence even if not statutory); Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648 (1987)
(excluding juror unacceptable and not harmless error unless opposition to death penalty would
prevent or substantially impair the performance of duties as juror in accordance with instruc-
tions); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986) (finding evidence that defendant adjusted
well to prison life between arrest and trial admissible in mitigation); Caldwell v. Mississippi,
472 U.S. 320 (1985) (invalidating death sentence after prosecutor told jury that ultimate re-
sponsibility for death sentence was held by appellate court and not jury).
77. One study has found:
Although a race of victim influence was found in all stages of the judicial pro-
cess across the studies, the evidence of race of victim influence was stronger for
earlier stages in the judicial process (e.g. prosecutorial decision to charge defend-
ant with a capital offense, decision to proceed to trial rather than plea bargain)
than at later stages. This is because the earlier stages were comprised of larger
samples allowing for more rigorous analyses.
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Death Penalty Sentencing: Research Indicates Pattern of
Racial Disparities: Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary (May 3, 1990) (statement of Lowell Dodge, Director, Admin-
istration of Justice Issues, U.S. General Accounting Office) [hereinafter Dodge Statement]; see
also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING, REPORT TO THE SEN-
ATE AND HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY (Feb. 1990) [hereinafter DEATH PENALTY SEN-
TENCING]. For several key studies, see David C. Baldus et al., Monitoring and Evaluating
Contemporary Death Sentencing Systems: Lessons from Georgia, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1375 (1985); David C. Baldus et al., Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical
Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661 (1983); Arnold Bar-
nett, Some Distribution Patterns for the Georgia Death Sentence, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1327 (1985); William J. Bowers, The Pervasiveness of Arbitrariness and Discrimination
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well as the geographical location of the murder. 78
The statistical sophistication of social science research has in-
creased sufficiently in the past decade to enable reliable answers to
questions on the role of race in the death penalty system. 9 In 1990,
the United States General Accounting Office (hereinafter GAO)
compiled a report on all the published and unpublished research on
the issue.80 The testimony of a GAO expert concluded:
In summary, we found studies of sufficient quality to support
the use of an evaluation synthesis approach to assess the rela-
tionship between race and death penalty sentencing. The results
show a strong race of victim influence: the death penalty sen-
tence was more likely to be sought and imposed for an offender
if the victim was white.81
The empirical research has revealed that the magnitude of the post-
Furman racial disparity in death sentencing equals that found under
the unconstitutional pre-Furman statutes. In other words, the em-
pirical evidence proves that the present death penalty system is ra-
cist 2 because an arbitrary fact, namely the victim's race, determines
who is executed."
The Supreme Court considered this issue explicitly in McCles-
key v. Kemp,84 decided in June 1987. McCleskey, a black defendant,
killed a white person and received the death penalty in Georgia.85
McCleskey used the Baldus statistics 6 to challenge his death sen-
tence on the constitutional ground that the death penalty system was
Under Post-Furman Statutes, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1067 (1983); Raymond Pater-
noster, Race of Victim and Location of Crime: The Decision to Seek the Death Penalty in
South Carolina, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 754 (1983); Michael L. Radelet, Rejecting
the Jury: The Imposition of the Death Penalty in Florida, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1409
(1985).
78. See sources cited supra note 77.
79. On methodology, see Baldus et al., Comparative Review of Death Sentences, supra
note 77, at 670-98.
80. Dodge Statement, supra note 77.
81. Id. at 6.
82. The GAO found the evidence was equivocal on "the influence of the race of defend-
ant on death penalty outcomes." DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING, supra note 77, at 6. More
than half the studies, two-thirds of them of high or medium quality, "found that race of de-
fendant influenced the likelihood of being charged with a capital crime or receiving the death
penalty." Id.
83. Id. at 5-6.
84. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
85. Id. at 282.
86. Id. at 286-92. For a report on the study, see Baldus et al., Comparative Review of
Death Sentences, supra note 77.
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racially biased.87 The Court accepted as true the statistical findings
by Baldus, among them that:
[Diefendants charged with killing white victims were 4.3 times
as likely to receive a death sentence as defendants charged with
killing blacks. According to this model, black defendants were
1.1 times as likely to receive a death sentence as other defend-
ants. Thus, the Baldus study indicates that black defendants,
such as McCleskey, who kill white victims have the greatest
likelihood of receiving the death penalty.88
Justice Powell, author of the lead opinion, found that the real-
ity documented by Baldus did not violate the U.S. Constitution and
did not invalidate the sentence.89 He used two basic arguments to
reach this conclusion. First, McCleskey had the burden to prove by
"exceptionally clear proof"9 ° that there was both an intent and ac-
tual discrimination in his particular trial even if the system was
flawed. 9' Powell's premise was that even a racially flawed death
penalty system could produce a just result in a particular case; there-
fore, the burden of proof was on the accused to show his own trial
was racially flawed.92 This is an impossible burden in most cases,
reflecting the reality of the subtlety and sophistication of contempo-
rary racism.93 Powell noted that while the Court has allowed statisti-
cal evidence to raise an inference of discriminatory intent in other
contexts, such as employment discrimination,94 it would not allow it
in the death penalty cases. 95 Powell said such a result was justified
because more variables were at work in death cases and it would
undermine the discretion that is the essence of the death sentencing
system designed by the Court.98 Second, Powell argued that even
though there was a likelihood that race prejudice might enter the
sentencing decision, the Court had surrounded the decision with pro-
tections, such as a jury trial and guided discretion, so that the sen-
87. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286.
88. Id. at 286.
89. Id.; see also Keith A. Green, Note, Statistics and the Death Penalty: A Break with
Tradition, 21 CREIGHTON L. REV. 265 (1987).
90. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 297.
91. Id. at 292-97.
92. Id. at 294.
93. Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Su-
preme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1404-06 (1988).
94. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 293-94.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 294-97.
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tencing decision was as fair as possible." The Baldus findings, in
light of these protections, argued Powell, did not "demonstrate a
constitutionally significant risk of racial bias affecting the Georgia
capital sentencing process." 98
The guided discretion system designed by the Court has not
done away with biased decisions. The most important determinant of
whether a person is executed is whether or not a white person is
killed.99 Perhaps this is a natural outcome in a racist society where
white people are more valued than persons of other races. In such a
racist system,' the execution of people who kill whites sends the
message to other racial groups that they should kill in their own
group, that their lives are worth less, and that if they kill a white
person they will die at the hands of the state. This is the unspoken
reality in the United States. The guided discretion system does not
operate in a neutral way in selecting its victims, despite the vaunted
procedures designed by the Court.
Powell argued that the jury system is the ultimate ensurer of
the fairness of the process. 0 ' This is a hollow argument since the
Court's own decisions indicate that a jury is not constitutionally re-
quired to impose a death sentence. In addition, without violating the
Constitution, a judge can override the decision of a jury to spare a
life, and may impose a death sentence.'0 The argument is made
even more transparent by the Court's own disemboweling of Wither-
spoon'03 and, in effect, sanctioning the concept that death-qualified
juries are perfect prosecutorial vehicles for death sentences.
The basic flaw in Powell's argument is his refusal to come to
terms with the evidence that the guided discretion system is racially
biased. Justice Brennan noted in his dissent:
Defendants challenging their death sentences thus never have
had to prove that impermissible considerations have actually in-
fected the sentencing decision. We have required instead that
they establish that the system under which they were sentenced
97. Id. at 312-19.
98. Id. at'313.
99. Kennedy, supra note 93, 1440-43.
100. Outcomes indicate that juries, prosecutors and judges exercise discretion in a ra-
cially biased way. See David J. Macher, Note, McCleshey v. Kemp: Race, Statistics and the
Death Penalty, 15 W. ST. U. L. REV. 179, 190-96 (1987).
101. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 307-12 (1987).
102. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984). See generally Radelet, supra note 77.
The Constitution does not require that a jury play any role in death penalty sentencing. See
Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
103. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
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posed a significant risk of such an occurrence. McCleskey's
claim does differ, however, in one respect from these earlier
cases: it is the first to base a challenge not on speculation about
how a system might operate, but on empirical documentation of
how it does operate.""4
The empirical evidence indicates that the arbitrary factor of
race is a key determinant of the death penalty decision. This is a
fatal flaw in the system because it does not recognize a basic human
right to race-blind criminal sentences.10 6
V. ETHICAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE DEATH PENALTY
The American public overwhelmingly supports the death pen-
alty; roughly 76% of adults back such a sentence for murder.1 0 6 Pres-
ently, public support for the death penalty is the strongest and most
widespread in the last thirty years.1 0 Below the surface, however,
public opinion on the issue is both dynamic and volatile. Gallup
polls indicate that over a thirty year period, support for the death
penalty declined from a high of 62% in 1936 to a low of 42% in
1966.1"8 The decline in public support paralleled a drop in execu-
tions from 184 in 1935 to two in 1967."9 After 1966, public support
for the death penalty began to climb, coinciding with the de facto
moratorium on executions which commenced in 1967."0 In 1972,
when the Supreme Court declared all existing death penalty statutes
unconstitutional, 53% of the American public supported the death
penalty and 39% opposed it."'
The widespread public support for the death penalty conceals
significant class, race, and gender differences. The strongest support
104. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 324 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 320-44 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
106. SOURCEBOOK 1991, supra note 1, at 211, tbl. 2.45. After the April 1992 execution
of Harris, 77% of the California public approved the execution. Skelton, supra note 20, at
A18.
107. SOURCEBOOK 1985, supra note 21, at 175; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 159, tbl. 2.3 (1987) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK 19871;
SOURCEBOOK 1991, supra note 1, at 212-13, tbl. 2.46; see Neil Vidmar & Phoebe Ellsworth,
Public Opinion and the Death Penalty, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1245, 1259 (1974).
108. Vidmar & Ellsworth, supra note 107, at 1249.
109. Daniel Glaser, Capital Punishment-Deterrent or Stimulus to Murder? Our Unex-
amined Deaths or Penalties, 10 U. TOL. L. REV. 317, 330, tbl. I (1979).
110. SOURCEBOOK 1985, supra note 21, at 175; Vidmar & Ellsworth, supra note 107,
at 1249.
111. SOURCEBOOK 1985, supra note 21, at 176, tbl. 2.37.
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for the death penalty is found among upper-income, white males,
who are Republicans." 2 The strongest opposition is found among
blacks and women, although support for the death penalty among
these groups has grown since 1972."' Polling data reveals that the
public believes that the death penalty lowers the murder rate and
reduces the general crime rate."' In California, 64% of the public
stated that retribution, "an eye for an eye," was the reason they sup-
ported executions.""
The United States Supreme Court recognizes two ethical justifi-
cations for the death penalty: deterrence and retribution."' The de-
terrence rationale holds that the act of execution itself will stop other
people from killing, a benefit that does not accrue if a person is
locked up for life. Poll data indicates that roughly 19% of those who
now support the death penalty would cease to do so if they were
convinced that it did not deter murder."1 7 The evidence on this issue,
therefore, is critical. If it is proven that the death penalty does not
deter murder, then a significant shift in public opinion might occur
that would leave the body politic deeply split on the issue.
Prior to 1975, all empirical research on deterrence, using vari-
ous research formats, agreed that executions had no deterrent ef-
fect." 8 This changed in 1975 when Isaac Ehrlich published an arti-
cle in the prestigious American Economic Review that concluded
that the executions did deter." 9 This study shifted the debate: most
commentators indicated that the evidence on the issue was mixed and
no firm conclusion was possible.' Since 1975, deterrence has been
the subject of numerous studies, an academic spin-off of the rising
tide of executions. "With but two exceptions," wrote William C.
Bailey, a leading student of the subject, "this new round of research
112. SOURCEBOOK 1991, supra note 1, at 212-13, tbl. 2.46. The 1992 poll data for
California support this finding. Skelton, supra note 20, at A18.
113. SOURCEBOOK 1985, supra note 21, at 176-77, tbl. 2.37; SOURCEBOOK 1991, supra
note 1, at 212-13, tbl. 2.46.
114. SOURCEBOOK 1985, supra note 21, at 185-86, tbls. 2.52, 2.54; SOURCEBOOK 1987,
supra note 107, at 166, tbl. 2.45; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE STATISTICS 229, tbl. 2.45 (1988) (hereinafter SOURCEBOOK 1988].
115. Skelton, supra note 20, at AI8.
116. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183-87 (1976).
117. SOURCEBOOK 1988, supra note 114, at 288, tbl. 2.44.
118. William C. Bailey, Disaggregation in Deterrence and Death Penalty Research:
The Case of Murder in Chicago, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 827, 827-29 (1983).
119. Thomas A. Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of
Life or Death, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 397 (1975). For a critique of the analysis, see William J.
Bowers & Glenn L. Pierce, The Illusion of Deterrence in Isaac Erlich's Research on Capital
Punishment, 85 YALE L.J. 187 (1975).
120. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184-87 (1976).
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found no support for the hypothesis that either the provision for cap-
ital punishment or the certainty of execution had a significant deter-
rent effect on murder.' 21  In fact, there is empirical evidence that
executions have an opposite effect by actually encouraging homicides,
a so-called brutalization effect.' 22 The massive number of executions
that will occur in the United States will provide12 additional data on
the issue. One can speculate that it will largely confirm what is al-
ready known: that executions and homicide rates are not interre-
lated. All the studies, even Ehrlich's, indicate that the certainty of
punishment, whether life in prison or death, and the amelioration of
urban socio-economic conditions, especially black male unemploy-
ment, would reduce the murder rate. 2 '
Retribution is the other justification for capital punishment.
This theory is based on a view that society is a system that is pushed
out of equilibrium when a crime is committed, and that punishment
is needed to rectify the imbalance.' 25 The underlying rationale is
that the punishment must fit the crime. From this perspective, it is
just that a life taken is balanced by a life surrendered. In addition,
retribution satisfies the population's need for revenge. If the state
does not satisfy this need, there is always the threat that the popula-
tion will resort to vigilantism. This threat is not an idle one in the
121. Bailey, supra note 118, at 830; see also William C. Bailey, An Analysis of the
Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty in North Carolina, 10 N.C. CENT. L.J. 29 (1978); Scott
H. Decker & Carol W. Kohfeld, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment in Florida: A
Time Series Analysis, 1 CRIM. JUST. POL'Y REV. 422 (1986); Richard 0. Lempert, Desert
and Deterrence: An Assessment of the Moral Bases of the Case for Capital Punishment, 79
MICH. L. REV. 1177 (1981); Marvin E. Wolfgang, The Death Penalty: Social Philosophy and
Social Science Research, 14 CRiM. L. BULL. 5 (1978).
122. William J. Bowers & Glenn L. Pierce, Deterrence or Brutalization: What is the
Effect of Executions?, 26 CRIM. & DELINQ. 453 (1980). The April 29, 1992, uprising in
central Los Angeles followed one week after the brutal gassing of Robert Harris in a carnival
atmosphere. Evan Caminker & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Lawless Execution of Robert Alton
Harris, 102 YAI.E L.J. 225 (1992); Stephen Reinhardt, The Supreme Court, The Death Pen-
alty and the Harris Case, 102 YALE L.J. 205 (1992).
123. Since 1984, the number of executions has averaged in double digits each year.
With the spread of executions outside the South, the prospect is for ever-increasing numbers as
the years pass. GREENFELD, supra note 12, at 10.
124. Ehrlich, supra note 119, at 417. In addition to the sources cited in notes 121-22,
see generally Glaser, supra note 109.
125. Ernest van den Haag, an articulate spokesperson for the death penalty, justified
retribution in these terms:
Justice, blindfolded, so as not to be distracted by the person of the offender, or
of his victim, weighs the gravity of the crime on her scales to reestablish the
equilibrium disturbed by the offense through an equally weighty punishment.
Retribution is to restore an objective order rather than to satisfy a subjective
craving for revenge.
ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS 11 (1975).
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United States with its long history of "lynch law."'126 The flaw with
this justification for capital punishment is that it is based on the pre-
mise that only the guilty will receive punishment. Once it is con-
ceded that the death system carries the risk that innocent persons
will die, 127 then the system-balancing rationale for the death system,
an eye for an eye notion, disappears. It is ethically corrupt to execute
innocent persons in order to prevent the guilty from escaping. It is
an obscene reversal of the traditional ethical value that ten guilty
persons should go free before one innocent person is destroyed. A
recent study estimates that 350 innocent persons have been sentenced
to death in the United States in this century, and that twenty-three
of these were executed. 28
The experience of Joseph Brown makes the point vivid.' 29
Brown was released from prison in May 1987 after serving thirteen
years on death row for a murder he did not commit.' Brown, a
poor black man with an eighth grade education, was convicted by a
Florida jury of murdering a white woman.' He was represented by
a young white attorney, in only his fourth jury trial, who was op-
posed by an experienced prosecutor, using perjured testimony and
unscrupulous tactics.' 2 For years, higher courts upheld the convic-
tion until finally, when Brown was just fifteen hours away from the
electric chair, already having been measured for his death suit, a
skilled appellate lawyer, using $50,000 of his own money, got a stay
of execution that ultimately resulted in a reversal of the convic-
126. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 283, 308 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
127. "The heart of the retribution rationale is that a criminal sentence must be directly
related to the personal culpability of the criminal offender." Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137,
149 (1987). What is left of the retribution rationale if the certainty of executing innocent
persons is a cost of the system? If murder is, by definition, a killing without justification, then
the state murders when it executes innocent persons. This means society murders to deter or
expiate other murders, a patent absurdity. This is not an abstract point. In January 1993, the
United States Supreme Court, by a 6 to 3 vote, denied a habeas corpus hearing to a man who
had sufficient evidence of innocence to convince a district court judge to grant him a hearing.
Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993). The tenor of the opinions indicates that the Court
would rule that it is not a federal constitutional violation to execute an innocent person so long
as the state trial was free of constitutional error. Id. The final sentence in Justice Blackmun's
dissent notes: "The execution of a person who can show that he is innocent comes perilously
close to simple murder." Id. at 884 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Reinhardt, supra note
122, at 215-16.
128. Hugo A. Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages ofJustice in Potentially Cap-
ital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21 (1987).
129. Barry Siegel, A System on Trial: Sentencing the Wrong Man to Die, L.A. TIMES,
May 10, 1987, at Al.
130. Id.
131. Id. at A20.
132. Id. at Al, A18.
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tion.1"' A humane system would err, if at all, on the side of life,
rather than death. Joseph Brown himself states the point most
eloquently:
I have firsthand experience that the system doesn't work. Only
certain people saved me. The judicial system tried, convicted
and sentenced me to death .... How do you know a person is
guilty? Are we willing to have a sentence with such finality,
when that question looms? How can we tell whether a person is
guilty or not? Are we that infallible? Are we that sure?""
The risk of the execution of the innocent is another reason for the
substitution of long-term imprisonment, including life without pa-
role, in place of the death sentence. It is clear, however, that as the
20th century ends, the United States is irrevocably committed to ex-
ecutions. The first California execution in over two decades consti-
tuted a quantum leap forward in the process. 35
VI. CALIFORNIA'S DEATH PENALTY SYSTEM
Prior to the 1992 execution of Robert Alton Harris, the last
execution in California had occurred twenty-five years previously
during the 1967 administration of Ronald Reagan." The victim at
that time was Aaron Mitchell, a black man.13 7 Since that execution,
the death penalty has had a turbulent history in the state. In 1972,
before the United States Supreme Court acted in Furman, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court declared the state's death penalty cruel and
unusual.1 8 The decision of the court, with only one dissent, was
written by a chief justice appointed by Reagan. 9 "We have con-
cluded that capital punishment is impermissibly cruel," noted the
opinion. "It degrades and dehumanizes all who participate in its
processes. '"4 o
133. Id. at Al, A19.
134. Id. at A20.
135. California is a key industrial state. Trends often start here and spread nationwide.
The California execution adds momentum to the spread of executions outside the South. Er-
win Chemerinsky, As California Goes ... In Legal Matters, California is Often the Proving
Ground for the Rest of the Nation, CAL. LAW., Aug. 1992, at 47.
136. Alan Abrahamson & Dan Morain, Countdown to First Execution in 25 Years,
L.A. TIMEs, Mar. 13, 1992, at Al; Dan Morain, Witness to the Execution: A Macabre, Sur-
real Event, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1992, at Al.
137. Abrahamson & Morain, supra note 136, at A28.
138. People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972).
139. KENNETH J. ARNOLD, CALIFORNIA COURTS AND JUDGES 344 (3d ed. 1979);
Stanley Mosk, Chief Justice Donald L. Wright, 65 CAL. L. REv. 224 (1977).
140. Anderson, 493 P.2d at 898-99.
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The public reacted to this decision the following year by
amending the state constitution to allow capital punishment. 1" The
legislature drafted new death penalty laws which created a
mandatory death penalty scheme.' 42 This system, invalidated by the
precepts of Gregg v. Georgia,"" was declared unconstitutional by
the state supreme court in 1976.44 In 1977, over the veto of Gover-
nor Jerry Brown, the legislature passed new death penalty legisla-
tion which met federal constitutional standards. 45 In 1978, the vot-
ers passed another initiative which expanded the scope of the death
penalty, repealing the 1977 statute. 46 People were sentenced to
death under both laws, and both laws have passed constitutional
muster. 14 7 California's death penalty jurisprudence is complicated by
this reality, since there are significant differences between the two
death penalty statutes. The key difference lies in the treatment of
felony murder."4
California has followed the federal guidelines and created a bi-
furcated system for the prosecution of capital cases.' 49 In the first
part of the proceeding, the issue is the guilt of the defendant and the
truth of the allegations of special circumstances, including felony
murder. If a defendant is convicted of first degree murder,' 50 with at
least one special circumstance, then the second proceeding takes
place. 5 ' Here the issue is one of sentence, with the choice being
either death or life in prison without the possibility of parole.'" 2 At
the second proceeding the fact finder must weigh aggravating and
mitigating circumstances and reach a decision on the penalty. 5
The felony murder rule provides a shortcut for the prosecution
141. Janice L. Maurizi, Comment, Constitutional Law-California Death Penalty Sen-
tencing Criteria, 5 WHITTIER L. REV. 457, 468 (1983).
142. Id. at 468.
143. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
144. Rockwell v. Superior Court, 556 P.2d 1101 (Cal. 1976).
145. 1977 Cal. Stat. 316; People v. Ghent, 739 P.2d 1250, 1276 (Cal. 1987); People v.
Frierson, 599 P.2d 587, 605-06 (Cal. 1979).
146. People v. Howard, 749 P.2d 279, 321-22 (Cal. 1988); People v. Rodriguez, 726
P.2d 113, 143-44 (Cal. 1986).
147. Howard, 749 P.2d at 321-22; Rodriguez, 726 P.2d at 143-44.
148. Carlos v. Superior Court, 672 P.2d 862, 866-71 (Cal. 1983), overruled by People
v. Anderson, 742 P.2d 1306 (Cal. 1987).
149. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1-.3 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993); Rodriguez, 726 P. 2d
at 143.
150. See supra note 149.
151. See supra note 149.
152. See supra note 149.
153. See supra note 149.
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to prove first degree murder."" It is a strict liability rule which holds
that a person who engages in certain enumerated felonies is held
strictly accountable if a death takes place, even if there was no intent
to kill.' 55 The rule eases the prosecutor's burden of proof and, as a
result, is "a doctrine often criticized as imposing punishment dispro-
portionate to culpability and for that reason strictly construed by the
courts."' 50 Both the 1977 and the 1978 death penalty laws in Cali-
fornia allowed proof of felony murder as a means to prove first de-
gree murder.' 57 They also allowed felony murder to serve as a spe-
cial circumstance which qualified a person for the death penalty.' 8
At this point there was a major variance between the two statutes.
The 1977 law would allow a death sentence for a defendant only if
he or she was "physically present at the crime scene" and "inten-
tionally commit[ted] or aid[ed] a deliberate and premeditated mur-
der."' 59 The 1978 statute, on the other hand, required no intent to
kill, allowing the execution of persons who killed negligently or acci-
dentally. 6 The issue of whether the California Supreme Court
should require an intent to kill in the 1978 statute became the most
controversial issue before the court. The issue was pregnant with
racial and class implications. The most common characteristic of fel-
ony murder is that it occurs during the commission of a robbery,
frequently involving a black perpetrator and a white victim. 6
The California Supreme Court first considered this issue during
154. The felony murder rule dispenses with the prosecutor's need to prove malice afore-
thought or premeditation. Carlos v. Superior Court, 672 P.2d 862, 866 (Cal. 1983), overruled
by People v. Anderson, 742 P.2d 1306 (Cal. 1987); George P. Fletcher, Reflections on Felony-
Murder, 12 Sw. U. L. REv. 413, 415-19 (1981).
155. Carlos, 672 P.2d at 872-73.
156. Id. at 865.
157. Id. at 866-73.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 867.
160. Id. at 868.
161. A 1974 study of felony murder by the FBI found that 60% were committed in
connection with robbery offenses. 63% of felony murder victims were white, while 38% were
black. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1974, at 18-19 (1974)
[hereinafter FBI-UCR 1974]. While most homicides are intra-racial, that is, whites killing
other whites and blacks killing other blacks, there is another pattern for stranger murder in-
volving robbery. Among persons serving time for murder in the nation's prisons, over 90% of
white inmates had murdered a victim of their own race. Among blacks the pattern was differ-
ent. Over 60% of black inmates in prison for robbery had robbed a white victim and over 25%
in prison for murder had killed a white. These statistics suggest that a common pattern of
felony murder is blacks robbing and killing whites. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNI-
FORM CRIME REPORTS 1991, at 17 (1991)[hereinafter FBI-UCR 1991]; CHRISTOPHER A.
INNES & LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD, U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, VIOLENT STATE
PRISONERS AND THEIR VICTIMS 5 (1990).
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the tenure of Chief Justice Rose Bird. The Bird court, as one might
expect, 6 ' resolved all ambiguities in the statute in favor of life, rul-
ing that the 1978 law required proof of intent to kill for both killers
and their accomplices before a person could receive death or life in
prison without parole.16 ' This 1983 ruling, Carlos v. Superior
Court,' became the major reason for reversal of death sentences
during the Bird tenure. During Chief Justice Bird's tenure, sixty-
four of sixty-eight death penalty verdicts were reversed.16 5 In most
cases, the guilty verdict was affirmed but the sentence was reversed
for further consideration, frequently on the issue of whether the de-
fendant had the intent to kill. 6 The conservative scrutiny that the
Bird court gave death sentences outraged the public, including many
judges.' Conservatives made the position of the Bird court judges
on the death penalty a major political issue. 68 In the election of
1986, Chief Justice Bird and two other justices were removed from
the court by the electorate.' 6 ' Chief Justice Bird was rejected by 66%
of the voters, the highest rejection rate among her peers. 7 The
state's judges' vote paralleled that of the public, with an estimated
64% of them voting against one or more of the three supreme court
justices.' The death penalty was the main reason for the
rejection.'
VII. THE LUCAS COURT
The upshot of the election was that Governor George
Deukmejian was able to appoint three justices, creating a five man
162. The Bird court had a reputation as pro-criminal defendant and pro-civil plaintiff.
Bob Egelko, Standing in Dispute, CAL. J., Sept. 1986, at 428; Pat Soberanis, How Biased is
the Court?, CAL. J., Sept. 1986, at 435. A revision of the view that the Bird court was proges-
sive has begun. Stephen R. Barnett, The Rose Bird Myth, CAL. LAW., Aug. 1992, at 85.
163. Carlos v. Superior Court, 672 P.2d 862, 877 (Cal. 1983), overruled by People v.
Anderson, 742 P.2d 1306 (Cal. 1987).
164. Id.
165. Philip Carrizosa, End of the Bird Era Became Clearest in Death Penalty Cases,
L.A. DAILY J., Jan. 5, 1990, § I, at 1; Gerald F. Uelmen, Mainstream Justice, CAL. LAW.,
July 1989, at 36, 39.
166. A.G. Block & Rick Ratcliff, A Status Report on the Death Penalty in California,
CAL. J., Sept. 1986, at 443-45; Uelmen, supra note 165, at 39.
167. State's Judges Voted Against Bird, L.A. DAILY J., Apr. 7, 1987, § 1, at 23.
168. Rebecca Kuzins, Looking Beyond the Retention Election, CAL. LAW., Oct. 1986, at
30; Richard Zeiger, Rose Bird Faces the Ultimate Jury, CAL. J., Sept. 1986, at 423-27.
169. Sarah Bottorff, Lucas Considered Likely Choice as Next Chief Justice, L.A. DAILY
J., Nov. 6, 1986, § I, at 1.
170. Id. at 20.
171. State's Judges Voted Against Bird, supra note 167, § I, at 23.
172. Block & Ratliff, supra note 166, at 443-45.
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block of appointees on the court, with his former law partner, Mal-
colm Lucas, as the new chief justice. 173 The post-war reality of Cali-
fornia having the most progressive state court in the nation, one on
the cutting-edge of law reform, came to a screeching halt overnight.
After the conservatives on the supreme court consolidated their domi-
nance in April 1987, Lucas granted his first interview as chief jus-
tice. He noted that the court had 175 death penalty cases pending at
that time, with two or three added each month. "We do spend a
significant amount of the court's time on them," he stated, "and it
may be to the detriment of some of the civil aspects of the court's
duties."'1 4 Lucas also indicated that he felt the court should recon-
sider Carlos v. Superior Court,"5 in light of new United States Su-
preme Court precedent.' 6 While denying that the court meekly fol-
lowed polls or election returns, he said:
I do think, however, that in the broadest of senses, every mem-
ber of the judiciary, United States Supreme Court or otherwise,
should have an understanding of the feel of the nation. I don't
think that's inappropriate at all. When you're talking about
broad principles, and we occasionally get into policy matters, it
seems appropriate at least to have some background understand-
ing of the acceptability of your rulings with the nation as a
whole, and in our case with the State as a whole.'
The interview revealed that Lucas had a conservative agenda for the
court. Action soon followed these words.
In August 1987, the Lucas court affirmed its first death sen-
tence.178 The majority on the court was ideologically conservative. 79
Generally this political position includes the doctrine of judicial re-
straint and honor for tradition and precedent, including judicial pre-
cedent. The Lucas majority showed no respect for precedent, when it
conflicted with its strongly held political-judicial opinions. In Octo-
ber 1987, the court took a major step and overruled Carlos v. Supe-
173. Robert Egelko, The Duke Puts a New Face on the Supreme Court, CAL. J., June
1988, at 236.
174. Ray Reynolds & Clyde Leland, We Have No Hidden Agenda, CAL. LAw., June
1987, at 21, 24 (interview with Chief Justice Malcolm M. Lucas).
175. Carlos v. Superior Court, 726 P.2d 862 (Cal. 1983), overruled by People v. Ander-
son, 742 P.2d 1306 (Cal. 1987).
176. Reynolds & Leland, supra note 174, at 24.
177. Id.
178. People v. Ghent, 739 P.2d 1250 (Cal. 1987).
179. Peter Allen, The Deukmejian Judiciary, CAL. LAW., July 1988, at 34; Carrizosa,
supra note 165, at 1.
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rior Court.8 0 This ruling was estimated to affirm the death
sentences in as many as sixty-four of the 190 capital cases then
pending before the court. 8' Essentially the court held that the prose-
cutor must prove intent to kill by aiders and abettors in a felony
murder killing but not for the actual killer."8 2 The actual killer was
to be strictly liable for such a killing, making the person eligible for
the death penalty. 8
A hypothetical situation illustrates the implications of this rule.
Assume that a young black man robs a store with no intent to kill.
During the robbery his gun accidentally misfires, " due to an un-
known defect, and a person is killed. Contrast this with the situation
where a man methodically plans a murder, collects the weapons, and
tracks and kills the victim. In the first situation, the accidental killer
could be found guilty of first degree murder on a strict liability the-
ory. Since felony murder is a special circumstance, it qualifies him
for the death sentence, and he will then either face death or life in
prison without the possibility of parole. In the second situation, the
case of the cold-blooded killer, who had both subjective and objective
culpability, there are no special circumstances present; therefore, this
person will be given a life sentence with the possibility of parole.
In Carlos v. Superior Court,'85 the Bird court held that such a
result was unjust and that there was no theory of capital punishment
that would justify it. First, by definition, it is impossible to deter an
accidental killing: an accident is not a rational, controllable event.
Second, since the accidental killer was less culpable than the inten-
tional killer, the theory of retribution was not satisfied. Carlos v.
Superior Court did not mention racial overtones, but they do exist,
since a high proportion of people imprisoned for felony murder is
black.' 6
180. People v. Anderson, 742 P.2d 1306 (Cal. 1987).
181. Michael A. Kroll, Death Watch, CAL. LAW., Dec. 1987, at 24.
182. Anderson, 742 P.2d at 1325.
183. Id. at 1325 n.8.
184. The hypothetical raises the issue of whether the actual killer should get death if the
killing was accidental. In Carlos, the Bird court stated that such a sentence would raise grave
moral issues. Carlos v. Superior Court, 672 P.2d 862, 875 (Cal. 1983), overruled by People v.
Anderson, 742 P.2d 1306 (Cal. 1987). The Lucas court had no qualms about sentencing the
actual felony murder killer to death even if the killing was accidental. Anderson, 742 P.2d at
1329 n.8.
185. Carlos, 672 P.2d at 875-77.
186. In addition to the statistics cited earlier, see supra note 161. Nationally in 1990,
over 60% of the people arrested for robbery were black. This percentage was by far the highest
percentage among blacks for any major felony offense. Blacks were arrested for 37% of the
aggravated assaults, 34% of the burglaries, 33% of the larcenies, and 54% of the murders.
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The Lucas majority, joined by Justice Stanley Mosk, who wrote
the opinion in People v. Anderson,' blithely dismissed the concerns
of the Bird court. The new court, Mosk indicated, was no longer
concerned that serious constitutional flaws were present in "a statu-
tory classification which impose[s] a minimum penalty of death or
imprisonment without parole upon persons who did not intend to
kill, while permitting some deliberate killers to escape with a sen-
tence of life with possibility of parole."' 88 Mosk wrote:
Whether or not we approve of the wisdom of the statutory clas-
sification, it appears to be generally accepted that by making the
felony murderer but not the simple murderer death-eligible, a
death penalty law furnishes the "meaningful basis [required by
the Eighth Amendment] for distinguishing the few cases in
which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in
which it is not.' 89
Soon after Anderson was decided, the court took a step to insulate
the death penalty from attack on racial grounds. 90
In May 1984, the Bird court appointed a retired judge' to
inquire how the race and sex of killers and victims influenced the
imposition of death sentences. 9 This required state and local prose-
cutors, with much protesting and outrage, to produce the records of
thousands of homicide cases.' 93 In October 1987, the Lucas court
ordered a halt to the investigation, indicating that McCleskey had
rendered the issue moot.' 9 The termination of this investigation
meant that there will be no hard empirical data on the racist nature
of the death penalty in California, allowing executions to proceed
SOURCEROOK 1991, supra note 1, at 446, tbl. 4.9. The arrest data is corroborated by the data
on victimization. In 1990, the perceived race of the robber was black in over 50% of the
reports, while this was true in 26% of the rapes and 22% of the assaults. Id. at 303, til. 3.53.
187. People v. Anderson, 742 P.2d 1306, 1309 (Cal. 1987). Justice Mosk, the longest
serving member on the court, has a schizophrenic flair on the death penalty. He sided with the
majority in 1972 when it was declared cruel and unusual. He sided with the majority when
Carlos was decided by the Bird court. He then made a complete break with his past, authoring
the opinion in Anderson that overruled Carlos. Philip Carrizosa, The Elusive Stanley Mosh,
CAL. LAW., Mar. 1989, at 63, 64. The only principle at work in Mosk's behavior is the
attraction to the center of power and influence, whatever its ideological outlook.
188. Anderson, 742 P.2d at 1331 (quoting Carlos v. Superior Court, 672 P.2d 862, 874
(Cal. 1983)).
189. Id. (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (Cal. 1972)).
190. Philip Hager, State Court Ends Probe of Death Sentencing Bias, L.A. TIMEs,




194. Id. at A3, A26.
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under a cloak of ignorance and darkness.195
After several terms, certain trends defining the Lucas court have
appeared. First, the priorities of the court are radically different than
those of the Bird court. The agenda of the Lucas court is dominated
by death penalty and attorney discipline cases, while the Bird court
had focused on civil and non-death penalty criminal cases. The Lu-
cas court has affirmed the death sentence in over 70% of the cases
decided. 96 When it has reversed, it affirmed the underlying convic-
tion at a 90% rate.1 97 Despite the priority given death penalty cases,
no real dent in the backlog has occurred."'
Second, the Lucas court protects the interests of the rich and
powerful in contrast to the bias of the Bird court in favor of the
downtrodden. The Lucas court generally rules in favor of landlords,
corporations, law enforcement, and the state.1 99 For a conservative
court, traditionally associated with notions of judicial restraint and
respect for 19th century values, the Deukmejian appointees show no
reluctance to overturn established precedents. In 1988, the court
overturned a landmark case that had granted insurance consumers
rights against insurance companies that had refused to settle with
them in good faith. 00 The precedent was nine years old and well-
established. By its decision the court eliminated an entire area of tort
litigation, the third-party bad faith lawsuit.201 Finally, with respect
to capital cases, it is clear that the Lucas court will follow the lead of
the United States Supreme Court, moving away from affording capi-
tal defendants more protection than required by federal law. The
Lucas court relies heavily on the harmless error doctrine, 02 while
holding defense counsel to minimal standards of competence.2 03 The
decision in People v. Wade 204 illustrates the latter point.
195. Id.
196. Uelmen, supra note 165, at 39; Philip Carrizosa, Court's Focus Has Shifted In
Lucas Years, L.A. DAILY J., Apr. 26, 1990, § I, at 1, 11.
197. Uelmen, supra note 165, at 40; see also Gerald F. Uelmen, Losing Steam, CAL.
LAW., June 1990, at 33, 44.
198. Uelmen, Losing Steam, supra note 197, at 44.
199. Allen, supra note 179, at 34-40; Egelko, supra note 173, at 236-40; Philip Car-
rizosa, State Judiciary Was Marked by Dramatic Shift, L.A. DAILY J., Jan. 5, 1990, § I, at 1.
200. Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 758 P.2d 58 (Cal. 1988), overruling
.Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 592 P.2d 329 (Cal. 1979).
201.
Mark Thompson, What Now for Bad Faith Lawyers?, CAL. LAW., Oct. 1988, at 15.
202. Uelmen, supra note 165, at 40.
203. The problem of competent counsel is acute at the appellate level. Robert Egelko,
Politics at the Gallows, CAL. LAw., June 1992, at 19.
204. People v. Wade, 750 P.2d 794 (Cal. 1988).
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In People v. Wade, Melvin M. Wade, a 24 year old male, beat
his ten year old stepdaughter to death in a cruel and brutal kill-
ing. " ' Wade had a history of mental illness." 6 As a child he had
suffered physical and sexual abuse.2" 7 There was evidence that he
had multiple personalities.2 08 Defense counsel told the jury that his
wife despised Wade and had, in fact, sent flowers to the victim's
funeral.20 9 Defense counsel indicated that he was disgusted by the
crime but had a duty to defend Wade.21 0 At the end of his argument
he told the jury:
I just want to conclude with, considering the disorder, the emo-
tional disturbance that the evidence has suggested to you by way
of the physicians in this case and the psychologists, I don't think
that Melvin Wade, Melvin Meffery Wade, can actually, can be
said to lose this case. As has been expressed to me by Melvin on
many occasions, he can't live with that beast from within any
longer and if in your wisdom you think the appropriate punish-
ment is death, you may be also giving an escape once again by
analogy the gift of life to Melvin Meffery Wade to be free from
this horror that he and only he knows so well. 1
The Lucas majority held that this argument was "not tantamount to
advocating his client's death;" on the contrary, it was reasonable,
tactical, and calculated to appeal to the jury's sympathy. 12 The Lu-
cas court rapidly cleared all legal obstacles to the resumption of ex-
ecutions in California.2 18
205. Id. at 796-97.
206. Id. at 798-99.
207. Id. at 798.
208. Id. at 798-99.
209. Id. at 810 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
210. Id. at 809-10 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
211. Id. at 812 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
212. Id. at 807. Justice Broussard in his dissent argued:
To the extent such an argument is directed at 'gaining the jury's sympathy for
the defendant,' it does so only by commending him to death. A defense attorney
who argues death as 'an escape' and the 'gift of life' for his client is not an
adversary of the prosecution. Rather, he comes very close to being exactly what
counsel told the jury he was not: a second prosecutor.
Id. at 812 (Broussard, J., dissenting). The conservative majority also holds that it is harmless
error if defense counsel fails to present evidence of mitigation if the defendant objects. Id. at
805-07. In effect, the court allows the defendant a right to execution. See, e.g., People v.
Williams, 751 P.2d 901 (Cal. 1988); People v. Miranda, 744 P.2d 1127 (Cal. 1987).




The courts in the United States, as well as society in general,
have failed to come to grips with the immorality of the death penalty
system. The preservation of human life ought to be the premiere
value of the state. When the decision to take life is made, it should
be based on the most compelling reasons. It is corrupt to base the
decision on arbitrary factors, such as race, which is the practice in
the United States.214 This is particularly true because a non-violent
alternative exists, namely, life in prison without parole. In a just
society, the state should err, if at all, on the side of life, rather than
death. If two punishments protect society equally, then the state
should select the one that preserves life. Selecting a nonviolent alter-
native would have the added benefit of introducing the concept and
practice of nonviolence into the culture of this most violent of indus-
trial nations.215 The state apparatus can set the moral tone in a na-
tion. At the present time, the United States prides itself on its mili-
tary prowess abroad, which is reflected domestically in the use of
state killing to control violent crime.
If the violence endemic to American social life is to disappear,
the nation must transcend its own violence-ridden culture. When this
cultural attitude is joined with the easy availability of firearms, stark
social-economic inequalities, and racism, a fertile mix for violence
exists. Table I is testimony to this reality.2"' Current social policy,
including the death penalty, is brutalizing the culture. At some point
reason will force the nation to consider non-violent means of dispute
resolution. The United States should end its isolation among indus-
trial nations and embrace the international consensus that the death
penalty is a violation of human rights.217 The death penalty should
be cast into history's dust bin.
The reality in 1992, however, is that the United States, includ-
ing California, is committed to the death penalty. California has
joined the states that kill, accelerating in the process the national
214. Dodge Statement, supra note 77, at 4.
215. Nonviolence rejects retaliatory violence as self-defeating. Instead it argues that
nonviolence breaks the chain of hate and revenge. See A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSEN-
TIAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. (James Melvin Washington ed., 2d ed.
1986).
216. See infra app. tbl. I.
217. Since 1965, 27 countries have abolished the death penalty and nine more have de
facto abolition. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 2, at 228; ROGER HOOD, THE DEATH PENALTY:
A WORLDWIDE PERSPECTIVE (Cal. 1989), reviewed in 22 CRIM. JUST. ABSTRACTS, June
1990, at 310; Rice, supra note 11, at 9.
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spread of executions. The fight to outlaw the death penalty cannot
depend on the judiciary to redress this violation of human rights.
The minds of the judges are closed, their consciences congealed. The
battle must shift to other arenas: the legislative halls and the forum
of public opinion.
A perusal of the poll data suggests that the point of attack for
shifting public opinion on the death penalty is deterrence.218 It was
noted earlier 219 that the weight of the empirical evidence indicates
that executions do not deter homicides, and, in fact, might cause
them to rise. The spate of executions that will take place in the years
ahead will provide more macabre evidence on the point. The Gallup
poll data reflected that roughly 19% of those who now support the
death penalty would cease to do so if they were convinced that it
does not deter murder.22 0 The evidence on this issue needs to be ag-
gressively conveyed to the public. If 19% of the present supporters
shifted, it would create either deep-seated public division or a slim
majority in opposition to executions. Public education on deterrence
is the opening wedge in the struggle to eliminate capital punishment
in the United States. Success, if it occurs, will arrive only after an
arduous, uphill battle. 2
218. SOURCEBOOK 1988, supra note 114, at 229, tbl. 2.44.
219. See supra notes 118-24 and accompanying text.
220. SOURCEBOOK 1988, supra note 114, at 228, tbl. 2.44.
221. Since 1976, national public support has ranged from a high of 76% in 1985 to a
low of 66% in 1976 and 1978. SOURCEBOOK 1991, supra note 1, at 212-13, tbl. 2.46. In 1991,
public support was 72%. Id. A 19% shift against the penalty would lead to deep public divi-
sion on the issue. However, there is substantial evidence that death penalty attitudes are not
based on reason and will not respond to empirical data that refute the attitudes premise. In-
stead such attitudes are rooted in personality type and are symbolic of personality traits im-
planted in childhood. Tom R. Tyler & Renee Weber, Support for the Death Penalty: Instru-





City by City Homicides
(January 1990 - June 1990)
Population Homicides
City (in thousands) per Thousand
Washington 218 34.6
New York City 1051 14.4
Los Angeles 452 14.1
London 99 1.5
West Berlin 27 1.4
Rome 35 1.2
Buenos Aires 34 1.1
Toronto 28 0.9
Tokyo 63 0.5
Source: N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1990, at 4/E.
Table II




South Africa 463 +
Nigeria 322 +















Source: L.A. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1992, at A3.
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Table IV
Deaths by State




















Source: L.A. TiMs, Apr. 16, 1992, at A3.
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Source: L.A. TIMm, Apr. 16, 1992, at A3.
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